CONTRACTS OF LIFE INSURANCE, &c.

CONTRACTS OF LIFE INSURANCE AS AFFECTED
BY THE LATE CIVIL WAR.
Two articles, somewhat elaborately discussing this subject, have
recently appeared in and were apparently endorsed by the influential
periodicals containing them. The first in the January number
1877 of the American Law Review, the other in the August-September number 1877 of the Southern Law Review. The discussion
was professedly of the general subject heading this article, but each
was in fact but a review and attempted vinfdication of the decision
of the Supreme Court of the Unite~d States-in the case of New York
Life Insurance Company v. Statham, rendered at the October
Term, A. D.,1876, of that court, and reported in the American Law

Register of December 1876 (15 Am. Law Reg. N. S.724).

It

will be attempted here to show that the essayists of these distingished reviews, as well as the eminent writer of the opinion,
which is the subject of their eulogy, respectively, have either failed
to comprehend or that they choose to ignore and slur over the vital
and only real issues involved in the case.
I. And first as to the opinion. It construes the contract made
by the policy to be "aan entire ciontract of assurance for life, subject
to discontinuance and forfeiture for non-payment of any of the stipulated premiums." "Each instalment [to wit, the annual premium]
is, in fact, part consideration of the entire insurance for life." * * *
"FPromptness of payment is essential to the business of life insurance. * * * Forfeiture for non-payment is a necessary means of
protecting themselves [the insurance companies] from embarrassment. * * * The case, therefore, is one in which time is material
and of the essence of the contract. Non-payment at the day involves
absolute forfeiture." * * *
"This is an executory contract in which time is material. In
such cases the prevalence of civil war does not excuse the performance Qf the condition nor prevent forfeiture from ensuing. There
is no suspension and revival of the contract -as in case of ordinary
debts. * * * Besides, the parties do not stand on equal ground in
reference to such a revival. It would operate most unjustly against
the company." * * * " Therefore an action cannot be maintained
for the amount assured on the policy of life insurance, forfeited
(like this) by non-payment of the premium, even though the payment
was prevented by the existence of the war."
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* * * "cBut the question arises, must the insured lose all the
money that has been paid for premiums? It seems manifest that
justice requires that they should have some compensation for the
money already paid; otherwise the companies would be the gainers
by their loss; and that from a cause for which neither party is to
blame. * * * So in the present case, whilst the insurance company
has a right to insist on the materiality of time in the condition of
payment of premiums * * * they cannot with any fairness insist
upon the condition as it regards the forfeiture of the premiums
already paid. * * * The insured has an equitable right to have
this amount restored to him, subject to a deduction for the value of
the assurance enjoyed by him whilst the policy was in existence.
In other words, he is fairly entitled to have the equitable value of
the policy * * * with interest from the close of the war."
Such is this celebrated opinion in outline. Four out of the nine
judges dissented from it; Judge STRONG characterizing the "annuity
doctrine" (which is the base of the opinion), and the "equitable
value" of a policy held to be forfeited, as being incomprehensible
to him; and Judges CLIFFORD and HUNT ignoring the whole
doctrine of the opinion and holding the payment of premiums to be
a condition subsequent, and that thi8 condition was an executory
contract subject to be suspended during the existence of war and
to revival when peace ensues, a8 in the case of any other executory
contract.
The opinion, however, overlooks what was the fact in the case that
the policy was not forfeited, for the premium was in fact tendered
ad diem, in gold coin, to a resident agent of the company in Mississippi, whose agency had not been revoked. So the assumption that
the contract of assurance made by the policy is executory and contingent upon the final completion of payment of all the premium
instalments ad diem, even though as to some of them it may be illegal
or impossible so to pay "from a cause for which neither party is to
blame," is untenable; for the contract to insure for the term of his
natural life in consideration of a certain annual premium is certainly
an executed one, subject to be defeated by the failure to meet the subsequent condition of annual payments, without legal excuse, and by
the fault of the insured; and the illustrations in support of it are
inapposite and irrelevant. The opinion seems to us inconclusive
and based upon false assumptions and strained analogies. What
then are the real and vital points-or more technically, the legal
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issues-involved in the Statham case upon the determination of
which only any satisfactory conclusion can be reached? To ascertain this it is essential that a brief statement of the substantive facts
be first niade.
On the 8th of December 1851, the New York Life Insurance
Company, by its written and printed policy of that date, insured
the life of A. D. Statham for $5000, upon the consideration of the
payment of an annual premium of $208.50. The policy issued in
favor of, and the sum insured was to be paid to his wife Lucy B. or
her legal representatives and in case of her death before the decease
of her husband the sum insured was to be paid to her children, or
to their guardian, if under age.
The period of insurance was for the term of his natural life.
The annual premiums were duly and regularly paid up to the 8th
of December 1861, and on that day the premium for the ensuing
year was duly tendered in gold coin to one Brown, who was then,
and from a period antedating the policy had been, the resident agent
of said insurance company at Grenada, Mississippi. The agency
of Brown was not revoked by the company or otherwise, unless the existence of war operated as a revocation. Subsequently to said tender
and during the period for which the annual premium was tendered,
to wit, on the 20th July, A. D. 1862, A. D. Statham died. His
wife died previously, to wit, in 1856. The suit against the company
was by the children and heirs of Lucy B. Statham, the beneficiary
in the policy; and was in the nature of a chancery proceeding for
relief against the forfeiture of the policy on the ground of excusable
non-payment of premium; and some jurisdictional questions were
raised by the company, but these are ignored by the Supreme Court
in its decision and therefore require no further mention. What is
the liability of the company, if anything, under the foregoing state
of facts ?
It is plain that the questions herein involved are these, and these
only:1. The construction of the contract of assurance.
2. The effect of war upon it as to mutual obligation.
3. Was the agency revoked by the war? and if not did tender
of the premium ad diem prevent forfeiture and continue the liability
of the company under the policy?
I. The construction of this contract.-The contract of life assurance has been well defined to be "that in which one party agrees
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to pay a given sum, upon the happening of a particular event, contingent upon the duration of human life, in consideration of the
immediate payment of a imaller sum, or certain equivalent periodical payments by another :" Bunyon on Ins. 1 ; Ellis on Ins. 101 ;
Angell on Ins., sect. 274; Phillips on Ins., sect. 147 ; 3 Kent's
Comm. 439; Paterson v. Powell, 9 Bing. (Engl.) 320. From
the very definition it appears clearly to be an executed contract with
subsequent conditions for the non-performance of which, without
valid excuse, it is subject to be defeated. The failure or neglect or
refusal to perform the conditions-in this case the payment of annual premiums (for no other breach of conditions was' alleged)without valid or legal excuse, may affect the liability of the company
on the contract, but does not change its character, noi make it executory. The promise to pay the annual premiums is not executed
until they respectively become due; and so also the promise of the
company to pay the sum insured, upon the conditions and for the
consideration named in tme policy, is not executed until the death
occurs, that both concur in consummating the agreement that they
will. It might as well be claimed that the main contract is executory as to the company, because the insured committed suicide
when he had agreed that if he did the policy should be forfeited.
II. If then the contract is an executed one, subject to the performance of certain conditions therein agreed upon, what was the
effect of the war upon it as to mutual obligation ?
It is not worth while to discuss the question as to whether the
contract was abrogated by the war, for although this was weakly
held in one or two cases upon supposed political considerations, as
in Taig v. N. Y. Lfe Ins. Co., 2 Ins. L. J. 861, yet it has been
repeatedly held to the contrary by the courts of several states:
Statham v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 45 Miss. 592; Sands v. N. Y..Life
Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 626 ; Cohen v. N. Y. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 50
N. Y. 610 lanhattanLife Ins. Co. v. Warwick, 20 Gratt. (Va.)
614; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Clopton, 7 Bush (Ky.) 179; and
also by the federal courts : Hamilton v. N. Y. Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
9 Blatchf. 234; Semmes v. Hartford Ins. Co., 13 Wall. 158;
and indeed in this case by holding the contract as remaining in
force until the time of a default, which time was several months
after the existence of war (to wit, December 8th 1861), it is practically decided that there was no dissolution or abrogation of the
contract by the intervention of war alone. But as this case also
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holds that in ti instance being (as is said) an executory contract
in which time is material, the prevalence of civil war does not excuse
thc performance of the condition nor prevent forfeiture from ensuing,
and that there is no suspension and revival of the contract as in case
of ordinary debts, it is probably well enough to say that all the
state courts and federal courts above cited have held to the contrary,
and even the Supreme Court itself, in a case perfectly analogous in
principle: Semmes v. HartfordIns. Co., 13 Wall. 158. It would
seem to be, therefore, beyond reasonable question that the intervention of war neither abrogated nor dissolved the contract, and that
there was a suspension of the right to require the absolute performance of the condition and a revival of the right to perform upon the
removal of the intervening obstruction by the restoration of peace.
And it may well be doubted whether any tender of payment or offer
to perform was necessary during the war in order to preserve the
contract and liability in full force; or that a payment within a
reasonable time after close of war would not be sufficient, if party
lived, to continue policy in force: 13 Wall. 158.
IIL The effect of the war upon the agency, and of the'tender of
payment of premium ad diem to prevent forfeiture.
Concerning the effect of the war upon the agency and whether the
existence of war operates as a revocation, for it is not pretended that
it was otherwise revoked in this case, it seems hardly necessary to
cite authorities, but it may nevertheless be said that they are uniform.
to the effect that war does not operate as a revocation of agencyreviousl4 existing, as in this case.
A distinction is made between agencies created before the beginnfng
of war and such as are attempted to be constituted after hostilities
have actually commenced. The doctrine is thus stated by Judge
DAvIS (United States v. Grosumeyer, 9 Wall. 75): "We are not
disposed to deny the doctrinq that a resident in the territory of one
of the belligerents may have, in time of war, an agent residing in
the.territory of the other, to whom his debtor could pay his debt .in
money, or deliver to him property in discharge of it; but in such a
case the agency must have been created before the war began, for
there is no power to appoint an agent for the purpose after hostilities
have actually commenced, and to this effect are all the authorities :"
United States v. Grossmeer, supra; Ward v. Smith, 7 Wall.
452, 453; Hamiltonv. N . Mut. Life Ins. Co., 9 Blatchf 234;
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Denneston v. Imbrie, 3 Wash. C. C. 403; Conn v. Penn, 1 Peters
C. C. 496.
To the same effect are the following 'cases in state courts: Sands
v. 'N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 626; Manhattan Life Ins. Co.
v. .Warwick, 20 Gratt. 614; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Clopton, 7
Bush (Ky.) 179; Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100 Mass. 501; Robinson
v. Inter. Life Ins. Co., 42 N. Y. 54 ; Buchanan v. Cuarry, 19 Johns.
(N. Y.) 137.
Chief Justice KENT in the last case reviewed all theauthorities,
and so also was this done by the court in Kershaw v. K~elsey, 100
Mass. 501, and the distinction above suggested is clearly made and
maintained.
Neither KENT (in his Commentaries) nor Parsons (in his work
on Contracts) fior Smith (in his Mercantile Law) nor any text-writer
of authority, mention the existence of war as effecting or operating
termination of the agency.
as a revocation of the authority or a%
In one or two recent cases it has been assumed, but this without
principle or authority to sustain it.
And the agent might lawfully receive premiums on policies in
force before the war, and such the insured might lawfully pay:
Manhattan L fe Ins. Co. v. Warwick, 20 Grattan (Va.) 614;
Sands v. N. Y. Lfe IAs. Co., 50 N. Y. 626. And a tender to such
an agent and his refusal to receive the premium * * * would save
a forfeiture of the policy: Hamilton v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 9
Blatchf. 234.
The effect of the tender of payment of the premium on the day
of its being due, in gold coin, to the company through its agent,
whose authority was not revoked either by the act of the company,
or by the operation of war, would certainly avail to prevent forfeiture, even under the view taken in the opinion of the Supreme Court
that such payment is absolutely required. But the opinion nevertheless assumes that the condition was forfeited, presumably under
the idea that payment was illegal. But if the agency continued during the *ar, as it certainly did, the payment might legally have
been tendered and received (20 Grattan 614; 50 N. Y. 626); and
this notion-of payment being illegal is unsupported by principle or
authority.
It thus appears, as we hope we have convincingly shown by this
review, that the decision in the Statham case, although by the highest court of the country, is not an authority to guide other courts in

